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Abstract 
 
Fair value accounting has become predominant in accounting as a vast number of IAS/IFRS 
standards are based on fair value accounting, including IAS 36 Impairment of assets. Fair value 
accounting for goodwill is technically challenging, since market prices are not observable. Thus, 
valuation technologies must be applied in order to test goodwill for impairment. 
 
While prior research on goodwill has concentrated on either the (dis)advantages for each accounting 
procedure for goodwill or examined the value relevance of goodwill (amortization) and goodwill 
write-offs, little effort has been devoted to the technical problems in the implementation of IAS 36. 
However, recent research on the topic document that firms commit a variety of errors in applying 
IAS 36 (Petersen and Plenborg, 2007). 
 
We examine firm characteristics that might explain the frequency of errors that firms commit in 
applying impairment tests. Our findings suggest that at least two factors might explain why errors 
are present – the lack of an impairment manual and not involving employees with rigorous 
experience in firm valuation.  
 
Our research, which might be seen as the fist step toward guidelines in applying technically 
challenging accounting standards, should be of interest to firms, auditors and standard setters. 
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How to reduce errors in applying impairment tests - an empirical analysis 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A number of accounting standards require the use of fair value accounting. Fair value may be 
estimated in different ways, depending on the accounting item and available information. For assets 
and liabilities that are quoted on active markets (e.g., securities) fair value is easily obtained. 
Goodwill, however, cannot be separated from other assets, and a market value cannot be observed.  
 
Thus, to estimate the value of goodwill requires the implementation of standard valuation 
techniques. An impairment loss must be recognized if the carrying amount of goodwill exceeds its 
recoverable amount. The recoverable amount is the highest of the value in use and (the 
unobservable) fair value less costs to sell (net selling price). Value in use is the present value of the 
future cash flows that are expected to be derived from the asset. Valuation of goodwill requires a 
thorough knowledge of tangible and intangible asset valuation methodology and purchase price 
allocation. This issue is complicated and has caused many arguments within the accounting 
profession over the past few decades (Seetharaman et al., 2006). 
 
Petersen and Plenborg (2007) examine how Danish listed firms apply impairment tests. They 
document that firms commit a number of errors as listed below:   
 
• Lack of impairment tests on the group level in cases where goodwill and corporate assets are 
not allocated to a lower level than the group level. 
• Incorrect calculation of the pre-tax discount rate. 
• Incorrect incorporating systematic risk in cash flows or the discount rate. 
• Terminal value calculation errors. 
 
Each of these errors may influence firm value estimates significantly, and, thus, whether 
impairment losses should be recognized.  
 
 3
As pointed out by Petersen and Plenborg (2007) firms and their auditors might reconsider their 
impairment testing procedures, due to the sheer number of errors and the differences in accounting 
practice across firms.  
 
Petersen and Plenborg (2007) argue that IASB has a joint responsibility for the inappropriate 
application of impairment tests. For example, it is unclear why IFRS 3 requires the use of pre-tax 
cash flows and pre-tax discount rates for valuation purposes.1 This requires that the iteration method 
is used in order to convert the post-tax discount rate (WACC) to a pre-tax discount rate, which is 
unnecessarily complicated. Also, Husman et al (2006) argue that the different approaches to 
determine discount rates in accordance with the IAS 36 guidance, Appendix A are theoretically 
different. They demonstrate that WACC is the only appropriate discount rate for determining value 
in use. 
 
Furthermore, the standard could be more pedagogic on several dimensions. For example, the 
standard would benefit from a thorough example demonstrating how the value of a CGU can be 
estimated based on a pre tax/post tax calculation and by adjusting risk either in the cash flows or in 
the discount rate.  
 
The aim of our paper is to identify firm characteristics that might explain the number of errors that 
firms commit in the application of impairment tests as required by IAS 36. We use contingency 
tables and multiple regression analyses to examine firm characteristics that are expected to be 
correlated with errors. Our analyses document that firms that use a manual or employ persons with 
experience in valuation commit significantly fewer errors than firms that do not. Considering that 
                                                 
1 According to the Basis for Conclusions of IAS 36 the reasons for the pre-tax choice is that post-tax accounting would 
have to avoid the double counting of tax cash flows already covered by deferred taxes, and that the computation of 
value in use by post-tax discounting would be complex. The Basis for Conclusions suggests that the pre-tax rate can be 
found by grossing up the post-tax rate by the tax rate. According to the Basis for Conclusions of IAS 36 one reason for 
the choice of pre-tax cash flows and discount rates for the present value measurement is that some future tax flows are 
claimed to be included in the deferred tax assets or liabilities whereas others are not. By ignoring tax altogether in the 
cash flows to be discounted, the problem of separating those included in the deferred tax items from those not included, 
could apparently be avoided. The Basis for Conclusions also warns of a possible inconsistency if future tax flows are 
discounted when measuring the value for an impairment review, whereas they are not discounted when measuring the 
deferred tax assets or liabilities. The meaning of this warning is presumably that if tax flows, after all, were to be 
included in the cash flows to be discounted, it would not be sufficient to adjust for the double counting in relation to the 
deferred taxes; the different approach with respect to discounting would also have to be accounted for. There is an 
inconsistency, however, in the arguments of the standard. If the existence of deferred taxes represents a problem for 
post-tax valuation, these problems would have to be solved equally when using the pre-tax method, since the pre-tax 
and post-tax method by definition should give the same present value (Kvaal, 2006). 
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approximately 2,300 pages are used to describe current IAS/IFRS standards, it is surprising how 
little effort that have been devoted towards examining how firms implement international 
accounting standards.  
 
Our results should be of interest to a host of parties including auditors, firms, standard setters and 
users of financial reports. Auditors will have to ensure sufficient, competent and verifiable evidence 
is obtained to provide a basis for the conclusion that the estimated value management has assigned 
to goodwill is ‘fair’, reasonable and supportable. For example, an audit objective in a suggested 
American Institute of CPA’s audit program for goodwill valuation (AICPA1, 2003, p. 67) is the 
evaluation of “the accounting policies for goodwill … 
 
”. The auditor is required to: “Assess management’s or third party’s capabilities to 
perform appropriate valuations and the process and assumptions used by management 
to develop fair values to complete the second step of the goodwill impairment test and 
to determine the fair value of any indefinite-life intangible asset. … Also determine 
whether the audit team has sufficient knowledge and experience to review evaluations, 
including underlying methods and assumptions.”  
 
Dagwell et al. (2004) argue along the same lines stating that auditors will be required to use their 
professional judgment and rely on managements’ abilities and integrity as well as sound corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as audit committees). 
 
Firms might use our findings to evaluate what they might do differently in order to avoid errors in 
the implementation of impairment tests. If for example firms that make manuals describing how to 
carry out impairment tests, commit significantly fewer errors, firms that do not prepare a manual 
should carefully consider doing so in order to reduce or eliminate implementation errors.  
 
Standard setters should consider to revise IAS 36 and other technical challenging standards (e.g., 
IFRS 2, IAS 39) and/or provide better guidance to firms in ‘how-to’ implement standards. Finally, 
users of financial information may find that errors in the implementation of IAS 36 raise relevance, 
reliability and especially comparability issues. 
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The remaining part of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the 
literature concerning goodwill. Section 3 describes the data set followed by a description of the 
research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses 
further perspectives.2
 
II. Literature  
Accounting for goodwill has been a controversial issue for decades. Until, recently goodwill was 
treated differently across accounting regimes. In 2001 FASB issued a standard that required 
goodwill to be recognized as an asset subject to (at least) annually impairment tests. Thus, 
amortization of goodwill over its useful lifetime was abolished. IASB followed suit a few years 
later by issuing a similar standard (IAS 36 / IFRS 3).  
 
Many argue that the impairment test only approach seems a logical step in the development of 
accounting for goodwill. First, the underlying logic for removing the traditional amortisation 
methodology is that the amortisation on a straight-line basis over a specified number of years 
provides no additional information for those using financial statement (Ravlic, 2003). Moreover, 
IFRS 3 no longer requires that companies perform the almost impossible task of estimating the 
useful life for goodwill (Jansson et al., 2004). Second, improved comparability, a balance sheet that 
better reflects invested capital and the notion that goodwill is not a wasting asset are believed, by 
some, to favor the impairment only approach. Third, the impairment approach should provide users 
of financial statements better information as goodwill is not automatically amortised (Colquitt and 
Wilson, 2002). Finally, a goodwill impairment test would be operational and capture a decline in 
value of goodwill (Donnelly and Keys, 2002).  
 
The impairment approach is supported by empirical evidence. For instance, Churyk (2005) 
examines the appropriateness of the elimination of systematic goodwill amortization by testing 
market valuations of goodwill. While only weak support for the initial impairment of goodwill is 
found, strong evidence of subsequent impairment is found. Likewise, Hirshey and Richardson 
(2002), Li et al. (2005) and Bens and Heltzer (2004), among others, find that goodwill impairment 
                                                 
2 This paper does not discuss the accounting treatment of goodwill (regulation). Likewise, only a short description of 
the population is given. For a more comprehensive description of these areas please consult Petersen and Plenborg 
(2007). 
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is valued by investors. In addition, a vast number of papers document that goodwill is valued by 
investors (e.g., Barth and Clinch, 1996; Jennings et al., 1996; Henning et al., 2000; Bugeja and 
Gallery, 2004 and Petersen, 2006), while goodwill amortisation is only perceived as value relevant 
to a limited extent (e.g., Jennings et al., 2001; Henning et al., 2000). These results suggest that 
goodwill should be recognized as an asset, which should not be systematically amortised.  
 
On the other hand, the new approach in accounting for goodwill may be questioned on several 
grounds. First, while amortization of goodwill is considered to be arbitrary, it is easy to apply in 
comparison with the impairment approach. The major benefit of amortization of goodwill on a 
straight line basis is that it is possible with a greater accuracy to predict the impacts of earnings. 
(Stevenson and McPhee, 2005). This is in line with Lachnit and Müller (2003) who argue that to 
achieve comparability among firms, adjustments for different accounting practices are necessary. 
Among the different kinds of treatment of goodwill, they regard the amortization of goodwill over a 
predetermined time horizon as the most useful practice. Only by amortizing goodwill on a 
systematic basis is it possible to determine “normalized” or “permanent” income as a measure of 
earnings power, which is computed based on recurring items only. 
 
Second, conducting a detailed test for impairment on every asset and associated goodwill from 
initial acquisition at the end of each reporting period may be time consuming and costly 
(Mcgeachin, 1997; Rockness, Rockness and Ivancewich, 2001). Third, as a result of the 
operationalisation of the impairment method there is much scope for creative accounting.  
 
While vast research on the value relevance of goodwill and a host of other accounting items (e.g., 
R&D, deferred tax) has been carried out, research on the implementation of accounting standards 
seem to be lacking. Even though there are arguments in favor of impairment, the standard (IAS 36) 
might be so complex that a proper implementation is difficult at best. Thus, the need to examine at 
how complicated standards are implemented in practice seems warranted. Anderson (2004) argues: 
 
“The theoretical requirements of IFRS 3 and IAS 38, the new and revised standards on 
business combinations and intangible assets respectively, have been well documented 
but there has been little discussion on how these requirements will be followed in 
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practice. “ 
 
Further, IAS 36 is a complicated standard and the implementation of impairment tests is technical 
challenging, which increases the risk that firms commit errors. This has also been pointed out by 
e.g. Ernst & Young (2006, 14):  
 
”There is a real danger that the increasing complexity of the accounting recognition and 
measurement requirements of IFRS and the increasing number of disclosure 
requirements will turn the preparation of financial reports into a mere technical 
compliance exercise for the benefit of the regulators, rather than a mechanism for 
communicating the performance and financial position of companies, and that key 
information will be obscured by the sheer volume of data.” 
 
A study by Petersen and Plenborg (2007) documents that firms make a considerable number of 
errors in applying impairment tests. These errors include the use of an incorrect discount rate, lack 
of impairment tests at the group level, if goodwill has not been allocated to individual CGU’s, 
incorrect estimation of the terminal value etc. This begs the question: What factors might explain 
this result? In our study, we examine factors that might explain the errors. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has not been done previously. It is our belief that our findings may be used going 
forward to secure a more correct implementation of new, complicated standards to the benefit of the 
users of accounting information. 
 
III. Sample selection and research design 
Sample 
All listed group companies must fill in annual reports in accordance with the international 
accounting standards (IAS/IFRS). In Denmark 82 listed firms recognized goodwill as of March 1, 
2006. We contacted the 82 firms by phone and found out that two firms no longer recognized 
goodwill. Four firms did not wish to participate in our survey, while an additional 14 firms did not 
fill out our questionnaire though they promised to do so. In addition four questionnaires were not 
filled out in full. Table 1 summarizes the composition of our sample:  
 
 8
Table 1 
Details about the composition of the sample 
 
No. 
Firms recognizing goodwill on the balance sheet as of March 1, 2006  82 
Firms that later on has divested goodwill   -2 
  80 
Firms that do not wish to participate in the research   -4 
   76 
Firms that do not participate though they agreed to do so -14 
Firms that fill out the questionnaire in full or in part   62 
Firms that fill out the questionnaire in part   -4 
Firms that fill out the questionnaire in full   58 
 
Even though the questionnaire is filled out in full, the number of observations in our regression 
analysis will be fewer, due to questions where firms’ feedback is in the category ‘don’t know’ or 
‘do not wish to answer’. 
 
As can be seen from table 1, 58 firms filled out the questionnaire in full, while four firms filled out 
the questionnaire in part. In other words approximately 73% has filled out the questionnaire in full 
and an additional 5% has filled out the questionnaire to the extent that they can be included in the 
research.3 A further description of the population is provided by Petersen and Plenborg (2007). 
 
Research design 
The purpose of this research is to identify firm characteristics that might explain the frequency of 
errors that firms commit in applying impairment tests. Based on certain firm characteristics that we 
consider relevant, data availability (i.e., feedback from firms that fill in the questionnaire) and 
experience from previous research, we identify a number of factors, which we believe might explain 
errors in carrying out impairment tests in practice. Below, we list six factors that should capture 
issues that might affect how impairment tests are applied in practice.4
 
                                                 
3 As 78% of all listed firm reporting goodwill is represented in our research, selection bias should not be an issue. 
4 We considered including big-four versus non-big four auditors as an explanatory variable. However, since all 
companies included in the sample are audited by one of the big-four auditing firms such a distinction is not feasible. 
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1. Firm size. Generally it may be expected that larger firms will have more opportunities to 
acquire competences within special disciplines, including firm valuation. This is supported 
by Bens and Heltzer (2004). Thus, larger firms are expected to commit fewer errors in the 
application of impairment tests than smaller ones. In this research, turnover is used as a 
proxy for size. Total assets are used as a robustness check. The reported results remain 
robust if this alternative measure of size is applied.  
2. Common model. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) recommend that the same valuation model is 
used across financial analysts in order to reduce the number of errors in firm valuation. 
Likewise, it may be expected that applying the same model (spreadsheet) across CGUs, will 
reduce the number of impairment tests errors, as resources are released to produce an error 
free model. 
3. Number of acquisitions. Firms that are often involved in merger and acquisitions are 
expected to have greater experience in valuation of firms and, thus, higher professional 
skills in relation to impairment tests and are priori expected to commit fewer errors than 
firms with limited experience with M&A activities. As the respondents only have the option 
to use a category variable to give feedback on the acquisition activity (e.g.., 0-1 and 2-4), 
firms that acquire 0-1 acquisitions per year is given the code 0, while the remaining firms 
receive the code 1 (i.e., firms that make more than one acquisition per year). 
4. Manual. Firms that systematise their working procedures are anticipated to commit fewer 
errors in connection with impairment tests. ‘Preparation of a manual’ is used as a proxy for 
how systematic firms are in applying impairment tests. Thus, firms that prepare a manual for 
impairment testing (coded 1) are presumed to make fewer errors than firms (coded 0) that do 
not. 
5. Number of hours per test (per CGU). A possible explanation for errors is that insufficient 
time is used per test. We examine if time dedicated to impairment tests may explain errors.5 
It is expected that the time spend for impairment testing is negatively correlated to the 
number of errors. 
6. Other experience with valuation. Employees with a considerable experience in valuation of 
firms are expected to commit fewer errors than those with limited knowledge about the 
                                                 
5 ‘(A low) Hours per test’ is not necessarily able to explain the level of errors identified in applying impairment tests. 
For example, if a firm thoroughly prepare a budget for each CGU, only little time may be needed per unit. Furthermore, 
some CGU’s may be more complex than others, that is, more time is required for each test. 
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subject. The respondents were asked to indicate their experience with valuation of firms on a 
scale from 1-5, where 5 indicates substantial experience. 
 
We divided our empirical results into two parts. In the first part, we apply contingency tables in 
order to examine the correlation between the types of errors and the six firm characteristics listed 
above. With four types of errors (as shown in table 2) and six firm characteristics, 24 contingency 
tables are needed. Using contingency tables is problematic if a few observations only are available 
for each combination (each table). In our study the limited number of observations is due to the fact 
that not every type of errors is relevant for the involved firms. If a firm, for example, uses a post-tax 
discount rate, it cannot not commit errors in the category ’pre-tax discounting’. This reduces the 
number of observations in the table, where the pre-tax discount rate is involved. The applied test-
statistics6 takes into consideration that only a few observations in each contingent table is available. 
Nonetheless, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
The second part of our research examine to what extent the total number of errors (firms commit) 
might be explained by some of the six firm characteristics. We apply a multiple regression analysis 
to test this as shown in equation 1:  
 
Errors = α0 + β1 size + β2 common model + β3 number of acquisitions + β4 manual + β5 number of 
hours per test + β6 other experience with valuation + ε   (Equation 1) 
 
where ‘errors’ is measured as the number of errors divided by total responses. For all six firm 
characteristics the coefficient (β1-6) is expected to be negative. We are not able to distinguish 
between types of errors, but equation 1 has the advantage that the six firm characteristics can be 
controlled for in the same test. This makes it possible to isolate the firm characteristics, which 
dominates the other ones. Furthermore, the number of observations increases.  
IV. Empirical results 
Empirical results – part I 
                                                 
6 Fisher’s exact test is used rather than the χ2-test due to the low number of observations in each contingency table. 
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The paper by Petersen and Plenborg (2007) documents that firms commit a variety of errors in 
implementing the impairment only approach for goodwill. Table 2 shows the number of errors for 
each of the four categories that firms most often commit. 
 
Table 2 
Overview of impairment tests errors  
Errors related to Number of firms making 
errors 
Number of firms doing it 
correctly 
Lack of allocation of goodwill 
and corporate assets 
12   5 
Pre-tax discounting 17   1 
Systematic risk 13 16 
Terminal value 11 32 
 
A total of 17 firms do not allocate goodwill and/or corporate assets to a lower level than the group 
level. If goodwill is not allocated IAS 36, 80 requires that the impairment test is carried out at the 
group level; however, 12 out of 17 firms do not do so.7 The impact of this type of error on firm 
value is positively correlated with the size of for example corporate assets.  
 
The other three types of errors concern the calculation of the recoverable amount based on an 
earnings capitalization model (e.g., the DCF-model). The first type of errors is related to the 
estimation of the pre-tax discount rate. The correct method for estimating a pre-tax discount rate is 
to use an iteration method; however, only one firm uses this method to convert post-tax to pre-tax 
discount rate. The remaining firms use other (incorrect) methods to estimate a pre-tax discount rate 
(e.g., dividing the pre-tax discount rate by one minus the corporate tax rate).  
 
Obtaining the pre-tax discount rate by dividing the post-tax discount rate by the reciprocal value of 
the corporate tax rate (1 – corporate tax rate) is only correct under very simplistic conditions, that is, 
only in the special case where future cash flows are infinite and constant. In all other cases an 
iterative process must be used. Thus, it is not possible to calculate a discount factor that can be 
                                                 
7 More specifically, each unit(s) goodwill is allocated to shall not be larger than the entity’s reporting format determined 
in accordance with IAS 14 Segment Reporting (IAS 36, 80b). However, if goodwill has not been allocated, presumable 
it must be tested on the group level. 
 12
applied to different projects, as the iterated discount factor depends upon the distribution of the 
individual projects cash flows. The impact of this type of error on firm value can be significant as 
exemplified in the appendix. 
 
The second type of errors in estimating the recoverable amount relate to recognition of systematic 
risk. In accordance with IAS 36, 55 and 56 and appendix a15, the systematic risk must be accounted 
for by either adjusting the cash flows or the discount rate. This is in line with recommendations in 
prevalent corporate finance literature (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2003), who name the two methods 
’certainty equivalent method’ and ’risk-adjusted discount rate method’ respectively. Theoretically, 
the two methods yield identical results and choosing between the two shouldn’t matter. Previous 
studies have shown that practitioners almost exclusively use the risk-adjusted discount rate method 
(Petersen et al., 2006). It is also the method that is often recommended in popular valuation 
literature (e.g., Koller et. al 2005 and Damodaran, 2002).  
 
A total of 13 firms estimate systematic risk improperly, while 16 firms appear to incorporate 
systematic risk correctly. For instance, four respondents adjust for systematic risk incorrectly by 
measuring the cash flow conservatively. First, measuring conservatively and systematic risk are two 
different issues. Second, in practice it is unclear what is meant by measuring conservatively. What 
some might perceive as conservative, others might perceive as the most likely outcome. Other 
respondents adjust for the systematic risk by probability weighting the future cash flows. This 
corresponds to what IAS 36, appendix A defines as expected cash flows. This method simply 
weights the different likely outcomes (cash flows) and adds them. The method is proposed as an 
alternative to estimation of the expected cash flows rather than the most likely cash flows. A 
probability weighting of the different cash flows, therefore, do not adjust for the systematic risk. 
Finally, a respondent reduces the expected cash flows with a fixed percentage. It is not possible to 
determine, how this percentage has been calculated, but if the same fixed percentage is used across 
business units that carry different risks, the adjustment for the systematic risk is not correct. The 
impact of this type of error on firm value can be significant. For instance, probability weighting of 
future cash flows does not adjust for systematic risk and, thus, firm value is systematically 
positively biased.  
 
 13
Finally, the third type of errors concern terminal value calculations. 11 (32) firms estimate terminal 
value incorrectly (correctly). A prerequisite for calculating terminal value correctly is that a firm 
must have reached the so called ”steady state”, where all parameters that determine future cash 
flows (turnover, expenses, invested capital etc.) has reached the same level of growth. The only way 
to assure this is to budget the free cash flows, based on the income statement and balance sheet, (at 
least) one year into the terminal period (Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001). The logic behind this 
reasoning is illustrated by the following simplified example. Assume that a firm has a free cash 
flow of 100 based on an estimated growth rate of 6% in the final year of the explicit forecast period.  
In the terminal period growth is assumed to be 2%. It might be tempting to calculate the free cash 
flow for the first year in the terminal period as 100*1.02 = 102. However, as growth is at a lower 
level less cash is tied up in working capital and fixed assets, and the level of the free cash becomes 
larger, so that it is in excess of 102.  In fact it is not unusual that the free cash flow is 30-40% higher 
than the calculation (102) suggests. Thus, if growth is assumed in calculating terminal values, 
which is normally the case, the consequences for the value estimate will be significant, if a firm do 
not make an explicit budget for the first year of the terminal period in estimating the free cash flow.  
This is also pointed out by Levin and Olsson (2000) who argue: “…even minor internal 
inconsistencies can have a substantial impact on the final value estimate of a company.” The 11 
firms that apply Gordon’s growth model improperly do not explicitly forecast into the terminal 
period. As a consequence, the terminal value is based on a free cash flow that is most likely biased.  
 
The above table documents that for each type of errors there is a large spread in the sense that there 
is a relatively large number of firms that commit respectively do not commit errors for each type of 
errors. However, 17 out of 18 firms apply the pre-tax discount rate incorrectly making it 
meaningless to test which types of firms that does it correctly respectively incorrectly. 
Consequently, this type of errors is not tested for in the following (contingency tables).8 For a 
further elaboration of the identified errors see Petersen and Plenborg (2007). 
 
                                                 
8 It should be noticed that it is primarily smaller firms that estimate the discount factor pre-tax. 13 out of the 18 firms, 
which estimate the discount rate pre-tax, are small firms. 
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Table 3 shows contingency tables for each of the three types of errors that are tested for. There are 
six explanations for each type of errors, which leaves a total of 18 combinations. As each cell 
contains few observations, Fisher’s exact test9 is used. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 panel A illustrates that small firms and employees with limited experience in valuation 
seem to fail to carry out impairment tests on the group level compared to larger firms and 
employees with more experience. However, the results are not statistically significant at any 
conventional level of significance. None of the other four firm characteristics explains, in any 
statistical sense, why some firms refrain from impairment tests on the group level (though they are 
required to do so). 
 
Table 3 panel B exhibits that small firms, firms with less frequent M&A activities and firms that do 
not prepare manuals, make more errors in adjusting for the systematic. All three firm characteristics 
are significant at the 1%-level. No other variables seem to explain, why firms adjust for systematic 
risk incorrectly. 
 
Table 3 panel C shows that there is not a strong correlation between the six firm characteristics and 
firms, which commit errors in calculating the terminal value. Hence, the derived test-statistics is 
insignificant for all six contingency tables. Based on the 18 contingency tables and the derived test-
statistics three of the six firm characteristics (‘firm size’, ‘number of acquisitions’ and ‘manuals’) 
are the key factors that explain why firms do not adjust properly for systematic risk. 
 
Empirical results – part II 
A weakness in the above tests is a low number of observations in each contingency table and the 
lack of control for several firm characteristics simultaneously. In order to make a more robust test, 
we apply multiple regression analysis based on the above equation 1. Multiple regression analysis 
allows us to aggregate the number of errors and control for the six firm characteristics in the same 
test. For each firm errors are measured as the number of errors divided by the total number of 
                                                 
9 Fisher’s exact test is an alternative to the Chi-square test. The Chi-square test relies on a large sample approximation. 
Given the small sample in our study, Fishers Exact test is used. 
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responses. If for example one out of three responses from a firm is categorized as an error that firm 
receives a score of 1/3. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
As a starting point table 4 shows the correlation between the response variable ‘errors’ and the six 
firm characteristics.10 It gives an indication of the expected findings in the multiple regression 
analysis; just as it expose possible problems with multicollinearity (strong correlation between two 
or more of the six firm characteristics). As expected errors are negatively correlated with most firm 
characteristics. In fact the correlation between errors and respectively ‘size’, ‘manual’ and ‘other 
experience’ with valuation is negative and significant at the 1%-10% level. Thus, ‘small firms’ 
commit more errors than ‘large firms’. Furthermore, firms that produce impairment test ‘manuals’ 
have fewer errors than firms, which refrain from making ‘manuals’. Finally, ‘other experience’ with 
valuation of firms has a positive effect on the number of correctly implemented impairment tests. 
 
Not surprisingly, the results in table 4 exhibits that large firms are more acquisitive than smaller 
firms (significant at the 5% level), and there is a tendency that large firms make an impairment test 
manual (significant at the 1% level). Firms, which use the same valuation model across CGU’s, 
produce manuals more frequently (significant at the 1% level). Similar results are found for firms 
that often make acquisitions. They make manuals to a larger extent (significant at the 1% level). 
These results indicate that large firms and firms that often make acquisitions and use the same 
valuation model across CGU’s, are more systematic in relation to impairment tests (make manuals). 
On the face of it the negative correlation between ‘manual’ and ‘hours per impairment tests pr. 
CGU’ is a little surprising (significant at the 10% level). A possible interpretation of the results is 
that firms that make manuals are more systematic enabling them to complete an impairment test 
significantly faster than firms, which do not prepare manuals. The correlation matrix reported in 
table 4 suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in the subsequent multiple regression 
analysis.11
 
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
10 Both Pearson (parametric) and Spearman (non-parametric) correlations provide similar results, why only the 
correlation matrix based on Spearman is reported.  
11 The variance inflation factor confirms this. It is less than 1.3, which is well below the critical value of 10. 
 16
 Table 5 reports the results from the multiple regression analysis. It is important to keep in mind that 
a distinction between the types of errors is not made. On the other hand, the number of observations 
increases to 35, while it is possible to control for the six firm characteristics at the same time. The 
coefficient for all the variables with the exception of ‘common model’ is negative as expected. 
Compared to the correlation analysis reported in table 4, the coefficient for ‘size’ is negative but 
insignificant. The coefficients for ‘manual’ and ‘other experience with valuation’, however, are 
negative and significant at the 1% and 2% level, respectively. The effect of manuals and 
‘experience’ seems to dominate ‘size’ in explaining errors in applying impairment tests. The 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables remain insignificant.  
 
 
Further analysis of the results (’robustness check’) 
The two firm characteristics, ‘number of expected acquisitions’ and ‘hours used per impairment 
test’ reduce the number of observations substantially in the multiple regression analysis, due to non 
usable information.12 As these two variables are unable to explain the number of errors, new tests 
are applied without these variables in order to increase the number of observations and, thus, check 
the robustness of our findings. The number of observations in this new tests increases to 48. 
Furthermore, the significance is even stronger for the ‘manual’ and ‘experience variables’ (not 
reported). The other coefficients, however, remain insignificant. 
 
Various test diagnostics (not tabulated) further document that the standard assumptions in linear 
regression analysis are not violated. As mentioned above, multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Likewise, diagrams for the standardised residuals support the assumption that the residuals are 
normally distributed. These further analyses support the conclusions in our research. 
 
 
V. Conclusions and perspectives 
We document that firms that use a manual and involve employees that have prior experience in 
valuation of firms commit significantly fewer errors in applying impairment tests. This, we believe, 
                                                 
12 Observations are not missing but unusable in the sense that firms in their feedback answer ‘don’t know’ or ‘do not 
wish to answer’. 
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is useful knowledge in a forward looking perspective. An impairment test is an exercise that is often 
carried out only once per year. As the calculation of the recoverable amount is a complicated 
exercise, firms should find it valuable to make an impairment test manual with assistance from 
employees, who are highly experienced in valuation of firms. Particularly smaller firms do often not 
possess sufficient capacity to dedicate one or more persons to valuation tasks. These firms may find 
it beneficial to use external financial advisors.  
 
As a consequence of our proposal impairment tests should be carried out more uniformly across 
employees within the same group and across firms. This increases the credibility of the reported 
impairment numbers, while at the same time a comparison of financial information over time and 
across firms become more meaningful. 
 
In a larger perspective, there is reason to believe that the implementation of other standards may 
cause difficulties. There is a tendency for international accounting standards to become more 
detailed and often more complex. For example, the use of fair value accounting increases the extent 
to which estimates are used in the annual report. Likewise, earnings capitalization models and 
option models are used to a larger extent in the implementation of international accounting 
standards (e.g., IAS 39 and IFRS 2). Our research documents the importance of incorporating those 
standards systematically in the annual report and the need for firms to spend the necessary (human) 
resources on the subject. This is in our opinion important to (listed) firms as well as their auditors. 
For standard setters such as the IASB, our findings should also be of interest. The new accounting 
standards from IASB are of such a complexity that significant know-how is required to secure a 
correct implementation. IASB should consider this issue carefully. A feasible solution would be to 
either issue less complicated accounting standards and/or increase the pedagogic effort in each 
individual accounting standard. 
 
Additional research that analyses how firms implement new, complex standards seem warranted. 
Potential standards for further examination include IFRS 2 and IAS 39. A further avenue to explore 
would be to examine the economic consequences related to errors firms commit in implementing 
complicated accounting standards.  
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Appendix 
 
The following examples show the consequences of calculating the before tax discount rate as the 
after tax discount rate / (1 – the corporate tax rate) inconsistent with the recommended iteration 
method in IAS 36.  
 
In the first example infinite lifetime is assumed, while the second example assumes finite lifetime. 
 
Example 1: Infinite lifetime 
In the first example the required rate of return after tax (WACC) is assumed to be 10%, growth in 
both the explicit budget and terminal period is 3% and the corporate tax rate is 30%. Finally, it is 
assumed that the free cash flow (FCF) after tax is 10.00 in the first forecast year.  
 
s growth is the same in the forecast period and the terminal period, is it not necessary to operate 
 the 
Example, indefinite lifetime
WACC (discount rate after tax) 10,00%
Growth in budget period 3,00% Terminal
Growth i terminal period 3,00% period
Tax rate 30,00%
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Tax  -4,29 -4,41 -4,55 -4,68 -4,82
Free cash flow after tax 10,00 10,30 10,61 10,93 11,26
After tax calculation
FCF 10,00 10,30 10,61 10,93 11,26
Discount factor 0,9091 0,8264 0,7513 0,6830
PV FCF 9,09 8,51 7,97 7,46
Present value of FCF 33,04
Present value of FCF - terminal period 109,82
Estimated value 142,86
Before tax calculation [WACC/(1-tax rate)]
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Discount factor 14,29%
Discount factor, before tax 0,8750 0,7656 0,6699 0,5862
PV FCF 12,50 11,27 10,15 9,15
Present value of FCF 43,07
Present value of FCF - terminal period 83,51
Estimated value 126,58
Iteration
Free cash flow before tax 14,29 14,71 15,16 15,61 16,08
Discount factor (unknown) 13,00%
Discount factor, before tax 0,8850 0,7831 0,6931 0,6133
PV FCF 12,64 11,52 10,50 9,57
Present value of FCF 44,24
Present value of FCF - terminal period 98,61
Estimated value 142,86
 
A
with two forecast periods. This assumption is kept, however, as in practice most operate with a 
budget period as well as a terminal period. In the example the budget period is four years. Under
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specified budget assumptions, the discount rate is 9.8% is too high (14.29% against 13.00%). As a 
result the value is 11.4% too low (126.58 against 142.86). 
 
In the next table the same budget assumptions are applied except of the growth rate. This is 
s seen from the table, a before tax discount rate calculated as 
riods (growth = 0%). Under other 
rowth assumptions, the discount rate before tax and hereby the estimated net present value 
 the following example finite lifetime is assumed for a project (5 years respectively 20 years) that 
dget year is 100 and the discount rate after tax is 10%. Further, growth 
r after tax / (1- the corporate tax rate) 
etime the before tax discount rate is 
ndervalued by 44.3% (14.29% against 25.66%). As a consequence the project is overvalued by 
rowth 
 
Growth 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Wrong discount rate before tax 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28% 14,28%
Correct discount rate before tax 14,28% 13,86% 13,42% 13,00% 12,57% 12,14%
Discount rate, percentage change 0,0% 3,0% 6,4% 9,8% 13,6% 17,6%
Value correct discount rate 100,00 111,11 125,00 142,86 166,67 200,00
Value wrong discount rate 100 107,53 116,28 126,58 138,89 153,85
Value, percentage change 0,0% -3,2% -7,0% -11,4% -16,7% -23,1%
assumed to vary from 0% to 6% in all future periods (contrary to 3% in the example above). 
 
 
A
 
Discount factor after tax / (1- the corporate tax rate) 
 
will only prove correct, assuming no growth in all future pe
g
(recoverable amount) is biased. The higher the assumed future growth, the more biased the 
estimated net present value. 
 
Example 2: Finite lifetime 
In
is valued. FCF in the first bu
in the lifetime of the project varies form –5% to 5% p.a. Under these assumptions it is evident that 
the shorter the lifetime of the project, the higher the impact from the before tax discount rate 
estimated as  
 
Discount facto
 
Assuming zero growth in the FCF and a five-year project lif
u
28.5% (487 against 379). The example further illustrates the effect of the error if the projects 
lifetime increases from five years to 20 years. It demonstrates that the shorter the lifetime of the 
project, the greater the effect of the miscalculated before tax discount factor on value in use. G
has an effect on, as evident from the example, the bias introduced by applying a wrong before tax
discount factor. This is hardly surprising cf. the example with infinite lifetime 
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Example, finite lifetime
Free cash flow aftyer tax, 1. budget year 100
Discount rate after tax 10%
Example, finite lifetime
Lifetime of the project, years
 
 
5 20 5 20 5 20
Growth in FCF p.a. 0% 0% 5% 5% -5% -5%
Wrong discount rate before tax 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29% 14,29%
Correct discount rate before tax 25,66% 15,90% 25,06% 14,82% 26,32% 17,30%
Discount rate, change in percent -44,3% -10,1% -43,0% -3,6% -45,7% -17,4%
Value, correct discount rate 379,08 851,36 415,06 1211,2 346,36 631,14
Value, wrong discount rate 487,09 930,79 531,36 1256 446,76 722,36
Value, change in percent 28,5% 9,3% 28,0% 3,7% 29,0% 14,5%
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Table 3 
Statistics over the correlation between errors in applying impairment tests and six possible triggering explanations 
    Size Common
model 
Number of 
acquisitions 
Manual Hours per test  Other experience with 
valuation 
      Under 
median 
Over 
median 
Yes No Under 2 2 or 
more 
Yes No Under
median 
Over 
median 
Limited Significant
Panel A 
No errors  2a 
(3.2) 
 3 
(1.8) 
 2 
(1.5) 
 3 
(3.5) 
 4 
(3.75) 
 1 
(1.25) 
 4 
(2.9) 
 1 
(2.1) 
3 
(2.6) 
2 
(2.4) 
1 
(2.6) 
4 
(2.4) 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
g
o
o
d
w
i
l
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
Errors   9
(7.8) 
 3 
(4.2) 
 3 
(3.5) 
 9 
(8.5) 
 8 
(8.25) 
 3 
(2.75) 
 6 
(7.1) 
 6 
(4.9) 
6 
(6.4) 
6 
(5.6) 
8 
(6.4) 
4 
(5.7) 
   p-value= 0.21b p-value= 0.88 p-value= 1.00 p-value= 0.34 p-value= 0.71 p-value= 0.13 
Panel B 
No errors 2 
(6.1) 
14 
(9.9) 
 3 
(2.8) 
 13 
(13.2) 
 5 
(8.0) 
 6 
(3.0) 
 2 
(7.2) 
14 
(8.8) 
10 
(9.4) 
6 
(6.6) 
2 
(3.3) 
14 
(12.7) 
A
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
r
k
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
o
w
 
/
 
d
i
s
-
c
i
s
l
o
u
n
t
r
a
t
e
 
  Errors 9
(4.9) 
4 
(8.1) 
 2 
(2.2) 
 11 
(10.8) 
11 
(8.0) 
 0 
(3) 
11 
(5.9) 
 2 
(7.2) 
7 
(7.6) 
6 
(5.4) 
4 
(2.7) 
9 
(10.3) 
  p-value= 0.003 p-value= 0.76 p-value= 0.006 p-value= 0.001 p-value= 0.64 p-value= 0.23 
Panel C 
No errors 16 
(14.1) 
 16 
(17.9) 
 
 5 
(6.7) 
 27 
(25.3) 
 17 
(17.1) 
 8 
(7.9) 
 12 
(13.3) 
 20 
(18.6) 
18 
(18.6) 
14 
(13.4) 
10 
(9.7) 
22 
(22.3) 
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
-
v
a
l
u
e
 
Errors  3
(4.9) 
8 
(6.1) 
 4 
(2.3) 
  7 
(8.7) 
 7 
(6.9) 
 3 
(3.1) 
 6 
(4.6) 
 5 
(6.4) 
7 
(6.4) 
4 
(4.6) 
3 
(3.3) 
8 
(7.7) 
  p-value= 0.29 p-value= 0.20 p-value= 0.31 p-value= 0.48 p-value= 0.67 p-value= 0.80 
 
a. The first (top) figure in each cell represent the number of firms. The second figure (surrounded by parenthesis) is the expected number of firms. 
b. Fisher’s exact test for equal distribution of errors across firms (i.e.. small firms =large firms). Significant values are marked with bold. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Correlation matrix: The response variable ‘errors’ and the six firm characteristics 
 Errorsa Sizeb Common 
modelc
Number of 
acquisitionsd
Manuale Hurs per 
testf
Other 
experience  
with valautiong
Errors  -0.24h
(0.08) 
-0.08 -0.18 -0.38 
(0.01) 
 0.06 -0.30 
(0.03) 
Size    0.14  0.28 
(0.04) 
 0.31 
(0.01) 
 0.14  0.09 
Common model     0.10  0.35 
(0.01) 
-0.08  0.20 
Number of 
acquisitions 
     0.37 
(0.01) 
-0.25  0.13 
Manual       -0.27 
(0.07) 
 0.08 
Hours per test 
 
       0.17 
a. ’Errors’ is calculated as the number of errors divided by the total number of responses (OK / Errors) 
b. ’Size’ is measured as the log of turnover 
c. ’Common model’ is coded 1 if the same capitalisation model is used across CGU’s in a group and 0 if this is 
not the case. 
d. ’Number of acquisitions’ is the expected number of acquired firms per year. Coded 1 if expected acquisitions 
per year exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise. 
e. ’Manual’ is coded 1 in case a manual is made and 0 otherwise. 
f. ’Number of hour per test’ is measured as hours used (on average) for each impairment tests (pr. CGU) 
g. ’Other experiences with valuation’ is measured on a scale from 1-5. where 1 indicates no or severely limited 
involvement in other valuation tasks. 
h. Spearman correlation coefficients marked in bold denotes significance on the 1%. 5% or 10% level. Only p-
values for significant correlation coefficients are shown. 
i. The number of observations ranged from 37-62. 
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Table 5 
Explanation of errors i impairment tests 
 
Model: Errors = α + β1size + β2common mode + β3 number of acquisitions + β4manual + β5 hours per test + β6 other experience 
with valuation + ε 
 Interception Sizeb Common 
modelc
Number of 
acquisitionsd
Manuale Hours 
per 
testf
Other 
experience 
with 
valuationg
R2 F-
statistics 
Number of 
observations 
Model 1.32 
(0.01) g
-0.06 
(0.52) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
-0.12 
(0.90) 
-0.31 
(0.01) 
-
0.0003 
(0.92) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
28.3% 3.1 
(0.02) 
35 
a. ’Errors’ is calculated as the number of errors divided by the total number of responses (OK / Errors) 
b. ’Size’ is measured as the log of turnover 
c. ’Common model’ is coded 1 if the same capitalisation model is used across CGU’s in a group and 0 if this is not the 
case. 
d. ’Number of acquisitions’ is the expected number of acquired firms per year. Coded 1 if expected acquisitions per year 
exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise. 
e. ’Manual’ is coded 1 in case a manual is made and 0 otherwise. 
f. ’Number of hour per test’ is measured as hours used (on average) for each impairment tests (pr. CGU) 
g. ’Other experiences with valuation’ is measured on a scale from 1-5. where 1 indicates no or severely limited 
involvement in other valuation tasks. 
h. The figure in parenthesis show if the coefficient is significant (1% or 5% significance level). Significant t-values are 
marked in bold. 
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